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Abstract
Biases in information processing undoubtedly play an important role in the maintenance of
emotion and emotional disorders. In an attentional cueing paradigm, threat words and angry faces
had no advantage over positive or neutral words (or faces) in attracting attention to their own
location, even for people who were highly state-anxious. In contrast, the presence of threatening
cues (words and faces) had a strong impact on the disengagement of attention. When a threat cue
was presented and a target subsequently presented in another location, high state-anxious
individuals took longer to detect the target relative to when either a positive or a neutral cue was
presented. It is concluded that threat-related stimuli affect attentional dwell time and the disengage
component of attention, leaving the question of whether threat stimuli affect the shift component
of attention open to debate.
The nature of the relations between cognition and emotion has a long history. For example,
in The Art of Rhetoric Aristotle (trans. 1991) foreshadowed contemporary cognitive theories
of emotion with his assertion that one’s belief about an object determines the emotional
reaction to that object. It is not the external object per se that is critical, but rather the
individuals belief about that object (see Power & Dalgleish, 1997). This notion is reflected
in many contemporary theories of emotion that argue that the initial appraisal of a situation
or object (as benign, positive, or negative) is one of the major determinants of the emotional
response to that situation (e.g., Lazarus, 1966; Mandler, 1984; Oatley & Johnson-Laird,
1987). These theories of normal emotion have their parallel in theories of emotional
disorder, which argue that disordered emotions such as depression and anxiety might stem
from disorders of thinking. To illustrate, the influential theory outlined by Aaron Beck (e.g.,
Beck, 1976) proposed that depression is characterized by dysfunctional schemata reflecting
a cognitive triad that focuses on negative views of the self, of the world, and of the future.
Beck’s cognitive theory of emotional disorders led to the testable prediction that people in
depressive and anxious mood states should demonstrate very general mood congruent biases
in cognitive processing. For instance, a depressed individual should be more likely to both
notice and remember negative information in comparison with positive or neutral
information. A large research literature has partially supported this prediction in finding
mood congruent biases under some conditions. However, it turns out that the pattern of
cognitive bias observed in emotional disorder is far more specific than Beck’s model
predicts. As reviewed by Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1988, 1997) mood
congruent memory biases are reasonably well established in depression (but not in anxiety),
whereas mood congruent attentional biases are well established in anxiety (but not in
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depression). This more refined pattern of cognitive bias dovetails nicely with the notion that
a subset of basic emotions evolved for different purposes (e.g., Darwin, 1872/1965; Ekman,
1992). As argued by Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987), the adaptive function of emotions
depends upon the particular emotion being studied. The idea is that basic emotions such as
anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and disgust evolved for particular functions. It is likely, for
example, that the basic emotion of fear evolved to enable an organism to rapidly detect and
respond to danger in its environment (Le Doux, 1996). Much research has been conducted
on the brain’s fear system in both animals and humans (e.g., Armony & Le Doux, 2000, for
review). The fear system involves a range of neural areas, in particular the amygdala, and
this system is especially sensitive to naturally occuring fear-relevant stimuli, such as snakes
or angry faces (e.g., Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998).
From this perspective, it should come as no surprise that different emotions may be
characterized by quite different patterns of cognitive biases, rather than by the more general
effects predicted by models such as Beck’s (1976). Because human anxiety probably reflects
the activity of the fear system, we would expect a highly sensitized attentional system in
states of heightened anxiety, with no particular reason to expect biases in memory. Thus, for
those interested in understanding the cognitive mechanisms associated with human anxiety
and in developing possible treatment strategies for anxiety disorders, the study of attentive
processing is especially relevant (see Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Wells & Matthews, 1994;
Williams et al., 1988, 1997).
The study of anxious individuals also has implications for understanding the basic
mechanisms of human attention. It is widely thought that a main adaptive function of
attentive processing is to facilitate fast and accurate perception of the environment and to
maintain processing resources on relevant stimulus inputs (e.g., La Berge, 1995). Yantis
(1996) pointed out that what gets selected by the attentional system at any given moment is
determined by (a) the properties of the scene and (b) the expectations, beliefs, and goals of
the observer. We would suggest that fear-relevant stimuli such as snakes, spiders, and angry
faces might have a biological basis for being prioritized by the attentional system. Evidence
comes from psychophysiological studies showing that autonomic responses can be easily
conditioned by fear relevant stimuli, such as snakes, but not by fear-irrelevant stimuli, such
as flowers (Esteves, Dimburg, & Ohman, 1994; Ohman & Soares, 1998). It is therefore
natural to assume that the attentional system of anxious individuals might be particularly
sensitive to the presence of fear-relevant stimuli in the environment. Thus, we suggest that
for those interested in the fundamental mechanisms of attention, the study of people in an
anxious mood state provides a good opportunity to observe highly sensitized attentional
processes. Moreover, for those interested in clinical conditions of anxiety (e.g., phobias,
generalized anxiety disorder, panic attacks, and posttraumatic stress disorder), the study of
attentional mechanisms may provide a deeper understanding of the cognitive biases
purportedly underlying these disorders, which may, in turn, be useful for the development of
relevant clinical treatment strategies. With respect to this issue, recall that several theories
assume fundamental biases in information processing play a key role in the etiology and
maintenance of many emotional disorders (e.g., Beck, 1976; Brewin, 1988; Eysenck, 1992;
Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Wells & Matthews, 1994; Williams et al. 
1988, 1997). For the reasons outlined above, this article will focus primarily on visual
attention and the processing of threat-related (i.e., fear-relevant) stimuli in relation to human
anxiety.
Do Threat-Related Stimuli Draw Visual-Spatial Attention?
A primary function of visual-spatial attention is probably to enable rapid detection and
analysis of new objects appearing in the environment (Yantis, 1996). It seems reasonable to
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assume that potentially dangerous stimuli may be particularly important contenders for the
capture of the visual-attention system, as it is highly adaptive to rapidly detect and respond
to threat-related stimuli. Empirical research in social cognition, cognitive and clinical
psychology, as well as neurobiology (e.g., Le Doux, 1996; Pratto, 1994; Pratto & John,
1991; Williams et al., 1988, 1997) has suggested that threat-related stimuli have a special
propensity to attract visual attentive processing. In this article, we directly address the
validity of this assumption. Specifically, we ask whether threat-related stimuli tend to draw
attentive processes toward themselves. An alternative possibility is that attentional processes
take longer to disengage from threat-related stimuli. The latter would suggest that the bias in
the attentional system occurs subsequent to the initial orienting of attention. We will argue
that this is an important theoretical distinction that has not been directly investigated before.
Evidence for the propensity of threatening stimuli to attract attention comes from research
using classic selective attention tasks in which threat and neutral stimuli are placed in
competition with each other, and the participant has to select one and ignore the other. For
example, Pratto and John (1991) presented various positive and negative trait adjectives in
different colored ink to a group of young adults and found that color naming (i.e., Stroop-
like interference) was longest on the negative trait adjectives. They concluded that the
negative information captured the attention of the participants at an automatic level, leading
to more interference on the color-naming task. Similar tasks have been presented to highly
anxious individuals that demonstrate that both clinically anxious people, as well as
nonclinical individuals with high levels of self-reported anxiety, take longer to name the
colors of threat-related words relative to neutral words (see Williams, Mathews, &
MacLeod, 1996, for review). Many theorists have assumed that these results reflect the
automatic drawing of attentive processing toward threat-relevant or negative stimuli.
MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) developed a dot-probe paradigm to more directly
assess whether visual attention is indeed allocated toward the location of threat-related
words in anxious people. In this task, two words (one neutral, one threat-related) are
presented about 5 cm apart (one above the other) on a computer screen. The distribution of
attention is measured by a secondary task involving the detection of a small dot that can
appear in the spatial location of either the top or the bottom word after the display is
terminated. Using this paradigm, MacLeod et al. (1986) found that anxious patients were
faster to detect the dot when it appeared in the location in which a threat-related word had
just appeared. This pattern was not observed in nonanxious control participants. Similar
findings have been reported in groups of nonclinical participants with high levels of self-
reported trait anxiety (e.g., Fox, 1993; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). These and related
findings have been taken as further evidence that anxious individuals are indeed
characterized by a hypervigilant attentional system (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Williams et al.
1988). Taken together, these studies suggest that there is a general tendency for negative or
threat-related information to draw visual attention, and that this is particularly apparent in
anxious individuals.
Further evidence comes from masked (subliminal) versions of both the Stroop (e.g.,
Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg, Bradley,
Williams, & Mathews, 1993) and dot-probe paradigms (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997;
Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). These studies report a similar pattern of results to the
unmasked tasks even when the words are, at least subjectively, below the threshold of
detection. This suggests that a bias toward threat-related stimuli occurs at a preconscious
level of analysis and is often taken as evidence that anxiety is characterized by an initial
orienting of attention toward threat stimuli. In summary, results from the Stroop and dot-
probe tasks have been widely interpreted as evidence for an anxiety-related bias in the initial
orienting of attention toward threat material.
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Problems in Interpreting Stroop and Dot-Probe Results
There is a serious problem, however, in interpreting the Stroop (and dot-probe) results
arising from the fact that the critical- to-be-ignored material is generally presented within
foveal vision. Although foveal vision and attention are not the same thing, there is a general
consensus that it is impossible not to attend to information presented within about a 1°
radius from fixation (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Treisman, 1969). Thus, with both the
Stroop and the dot-probe tasks it is impossible to determine whether the threatening
information draws attention or whether, once detected, threat-related information holds
attention. Both processes would of course lead to longer color-naming times on a Stroop
task and, similarly, longer latencies on the dot-probe tasks. The problem in interpreting the
latter results is that, even though the two words are spatially separated, both locations are
task relevant. Thus, an obvious strategy to be adopted by a participant would be to attend to
both locations, or rapidly shift attention between the upper and lower locations. Arguably
therefore, in the dot-probe task, the critical stimuli never appear in truly unattended
locations.
An additional problem with early versions of the dot probe was that participants had to name
aloud the upper word (i.e., attend to the upper location). This means that if the dot appeared
in the lower location, any bias might reflect the shift component of attention, whereas a dot
appearing in the upper location would likely reflect a bias in the hold or disengage
component (see Wells & Matthews, 1994, for further discussion). Later experiments
circumvented this problem by presenting a central fixation and requiring participants to
discriminate a target appearing in the upper or lower locations (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, Falla,
& Hamilton, 1998). However, even with this procedure the problem remains that in most
studies the stimuli are presented for a relatively long time (500 ms) and both locations are
task relevant. Thus, both locations are likely to receive attentive processing. The important
point is that it is difficult to determine whether threat-related stimuli attract attention to
themselves in the first place or whether once a threat stimulus has been detected, attention
tends to then dwell in that location.
On this issue there is some indication that threat-related or negative stimuli may affect
attentional dwell time rather than automatically attracting attentive processing. First, White
(1996) replicated the Stroop results of Pratto and John (1991) by showing that participants
took longer to name the colors of negative relative to positive trait adjectives. However,
White (1996) then required participants to name centrally located color patches while
ignoring spatially separate trait adjectives. If negative information does indeed draw
attention, as implied by Pratto and John, then the spatially separate adjectives should also
produce Stroop-like interference. However, the results showed no evidence for increased
Stroop-like interference from negative adjectives when they were spatially separate from
fixation (White, 1996). This finding casts some doubt on the assumption that negative
information induces a faster shift of spatial attention to its own location. A similar doubt was
raised by results reported by Fox (1994). In her study, threat-related and neutral words were
presented to anxious and control participants in a spatially separate location from fixation.
Under these conditions, neither high nor low trait-anxious participants showed any evidence
for increased Stroop-like interference. These results (Fox, 1994; White, 1996) indicate that
the presence of threat-related stimuli in the visual environment may not necessarily draw
visual attentive processes to their location, thus arguing against the notion that anxiety may
be characterized by a hypervigilance of the attentional system (Eysenck, 1992).
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Is Exogenous Orienting of Attention Immune to the Influence of Higher
Level Cognitive Variables?
It is our contention that the observation of anxiety-related attentional bias with foveal stimuli
alongside the failure to find such a bias from spatially unattended stimuli is theoretically
important. This is because it suggests that the bias may not be due to threat-related stimuli
automatically drawing visual attention, but could well be due to the anxious individual’s
inability to disengage attention from threatening stimuli once such stimuli have been
attended. In other words, attending to threat-related stimuli may increase attentional dwell
time resulting in a slower disengagement from negatively valenced stimuli. This hypothesis
can be directly investigated in accordance with a relatively new model of visual-spatial
attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990) that has not yet been widely applied to anxiety-related
attentional bias. There is now substantial evidence that the human attention system is not
unitary but instead consists of (at least) three components: attentional shifting, engagement,
and disengagement (Posner & Petersen, 1990).
To assess the precise mechanism responsible for the attentional bias effects observed in
anxiety, a modification of the exogenous cueing paradigm used by Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich,
and Cohen (1987) was used. In this task, participants are required to detect a target (e.g., a
square) that may appear to the left or to the right of a fixation point. On some trials, a cue
(e.g. a flashing light) highlights the area in which the target will appear. A key feature of this
arrangement is that the cue correctly predicts the target location only 80% of the time (i.e., a
valid cue). In the remaining 20% of the trials, the target appears in the opposite location to
the cue (i.e., an invalid cue). The typical finding is that a valid cue leads to a benefit in
response times (RTs), whereas an invalid cue leads to a RT cost relative to an uncued
condition. Simply put, an exogenous cue induces a covert orienting of attention to the cued
location leading to faster RTs on valid trials and slower RTs on invalid trials. This is
generally known as a cue validity effect.
Exogenous cues produce facilitatory effects that are strongest when the temporal separation
between the cue and the target is less than about 200 ms. Moreover, cue validity effects
occur regardless of whether the cue is actually informative; the cues are difficult to ignore
even when the participant has been explicitly instructed to do so (see Jonides, 1981, for an
overview). Because of these characteristics of exogenous cueing, it is widely assumed that
peripheral cues reflect the operation of a reflexive orienting system that is immune to higher
level cognitive influences (e.g., Briand & Klein, 1987; Posner, 1980). In other words, it is
assumed that orienting of attention by means of exogenous cues reflects an encapsulated
system that cannot be affected by other cognitive processes, such as voluntary control, for
example.
If this is correct, then we would not expect the meaning or valence of a cue to affect the
speed or accuracy of attentional orienting. However, in a recent study this assumption has
been questioned. Stolz (1996) used an exogenous cueing paradigm to assess whether spatial
attention processes can be influenced by higher level linguistic variables. Participants were
required to fixate on a word at the center of a computer screen. An abrupt-onset word cue
was then presented either above or below fixation, followed immediately by a target to be
detected in either the cued or the uncued location. The key manipulation was that on one
half of the trials, the word cue was semantically related to the fixation word. The results
clearly demonstrated that the semantic relation between the fixation word and the cue word
had a strong influence on the related cue’s ability to hold attention at the cued location.
Thus, RTs on invalid related trials were slowed considerably, relative to invalid unrelated
trials, suggesting that a related cue hindered the disengagement process. However, no
differences were found between related and unrelated valid trials, suggesting that a related
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cue did not affect the ability of the cue to draw attention. Stolz concluded that the shift
component of attention may be encapsulated (i.e., not affected by higher level variables) but
that the disengage component is not encapsulated. These results are relevant to our study in
that they suggest that we should not necessarily expect threat-related stimuli to draw spatial
attention, but that such stimuli may well affect the disengage component of attention. This,
of course, is exactly in line with our prediction.
The Present Study
The novelty of our modification of the exogenous cueing paradigm is that the valence of the
cue was manipulated. Across five experiments, the cue was a word (or face) that was
neutral, positive, or threat-related, whereas the target was a neutral geometric shape (circle).
We included stimuli with a positive emotional valence to check that any bias we found was
specific to threat material rather than to emotional material in general, regardless of valence
(cf. Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991; Russo, Patterson, Roberson, Stevenson, & Upward,
1996). We should note at this point that our negative stimuli, however, were always fear-
relevant and, therefore, we did not assess whether negative but non threat-related stimuli
(e.g., sad faces) might produce the same effect. From an evolutionary perspective, it can be
predicted that fear-relevant stimuli might activate the fear-detection system, whereas more
general negative stimuli should not (Ohman & Soares, 1993). We intend to address these
issues in future studies; however, in the present study, we restrict ourselves to critical stimuli
(threat-related words, angry faces) that should be fear-relevant for people in anxious mood
states.
We suggest that the cueing paradigm should allow us to distinguish between two processes
potentially responsible for previous demonstrations of attentional bias effects in anxiety. We
expect no difference between anxious and nonanxious participants when the cue is a neutral
word (or face). The critical trials are those in which the cue is a threat-related or positive
stimulus. If threat-related (or positive) stimuli automatically draw the attention of anxious
people then they might well be faster than control participants in responding to a target when
the cue is valid. This result would indicate that anxious people are faster than control
participants in shifting their attention to the location of a threat-related cue. On the other
hand, if anxious participants have a problem in disengaging attention from threatening (or
positive) information, then they should be slower than control participants in responding to
the target on invalid cue trials. If threat (and not only emotion) is instrumental in inducing
attentional bias in anxiety (or disrupting the disengagement of attention), then no difference
between anxious and control participants should occur when either neutral or positively
valenced cues are used.
In light of the evidence reviewed previously showing that the presence of threat-related
stimuli in unattended locations does not involuntarily draw attention (Fox, 1994; White,
1996), it is predicted that attentional bias toward threat may be due to defective
disengagement from threatening stimuli. Thus, we predict a difference on the disengage
component of attention (i.e., invalidly cued trials), which should be stronger for high state-
anxious participants than for low state-anxious participants. The evaluation of the shift
component of attention is probably not best measured by the cueing paradigm, as RTs are
generally very fast on valid trials. Expecting threat-related cues to further speed responding
to a target is probably not realistic. On a more general level, however, our experiments
provide a further test of the hypothesis that exogenous orienting is immune to the influence
of higher order cognitive variables (cf. Stolz, 1996). Whereas Stolz examined variations in
semantic features of cues, we examine variations in the emotional valence of cues.
Fox et al. Page 6









State or Trait Anxiety?
In this article we focus on the construct of state-anxiety rather than trait-anxiety. Trait-
anxiety is considered to be a personality disposition resulting in a higher frequency of
episodes of increased situational or state-anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). There is some ambiguity
about which type of anxiety drives attentional biases, with most researchers assuming that
the interaction between trait- and state-anxiety is probably important (see Broadbent &
Broadbent, 1988; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowel, 1994). In the
present article, we felt that it was more appropriate to focus on state-anxiety because, on an
intuitive level, elevations of state-anxiety would appear to be directly related to the
activation of the fear-detection system. There is a substantial research base suggesting that
the presence of biologically relevant threatening stimuli (e.g., a predator or an angry face)
directly activates the fear-detection system at a neural level (e.g., Armony & Le Doux, 2000;
Le Doux, 1996). It is activation of this system that we believe underlies the nature of the
relationship between the attentional and the affective systems of the human brain. Although
trait- and state-anxiety are highly correlated (Eysenck, 1992), we believe that state-anxiety
provides a direct measure of the activation of the fear-detection system and thus allows us to
relate our results more directly to both the social cognition (e.g., Pratto, 1994) and
neurobiological literatures (e.g., Le Doux, 1996).
On a methodological point, we have collected state-anxiety measures on a large sample of
participants (>300) gleaned from the same population as the participants in the present
experiments. The median state-anxiety score of this sample was 37.5. Because it is difficult
to categorize people scoring close to the median, we decided to analyze only the data from
people scoring at or above 40 on the State-Anxiety scale (high state-anxious) and those
scoring at or below 35 (low state-anxious) in the current experiments. Thus. any participant
scoring from 36 to 39 on the State-Anxiety scale was not included in the data analysis.
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 is to determine (a) whether threat-related (or positive) words are
more potent than neutral words in inducing an attentional shift to their own location, and (b)
whether threat-related (or positive) words are more likely to hold visual attention than
neutral words as measured by slower RTs on invalid trials (i.e., the disengage component).
On the basis of the literature reviewed earlier, we made three specific predictions. First, we
predicted that threat words will not be any more effective than neutral or positive words in
attracting visual attention (i.e., equal RTs on neutral, positive, and negative word valid
trials). Second, we predicted that RTs on invalid threat trials will be slower than RTs on
invalid neutral or positive trials. Third, we predicted that the latter result will be significantly
larger for high state-anxious relative than for low state-anxious participants. Because
previous research has shown that attentional bias effects are strongest when state-anxiety is
elevated above baseline levels (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg et al., 1994), we
attempted to induce an elevation of state-anxiety immediately prior to the cueing task. We
presented participants with photographs of distressing scenes, which has been successful in
inducing state-anxiety in previous studies in our lab (Fox, 1996).
Method
Participants—Participants were 59 undergraduate students from the University of Essex
campus community, ranging in age from 17 to 34 years, with a modal age in the 20s. Those
scoring at or above a score of 40 (n=26) on the Spielberger State-Anxiety scale immediately
prior to the experiment and those scoring at or below 35 (n = 24) were classified as high and
low state-anxious participants, respectively. These cutoffs resulted in the loss of 9
participants who scored between 35 and 40 on the State-Anxiety scale at test. Each person
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had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and participated in two experimental sessions
consisting of 45 min and 15 min, respectively, for which they received payment of £4.
Materials
Mood induction—Ten A4 enlarged photographs of disaster scenes, urban terrorism, and
riot police, selected from contemporary news magazines on the basis of their horrific
content, were selected for the mood induction procedure. A brief questionnaire was also
constructed to allow participants to rank order the photographs on the basis of how
“frightening” they were.
Personality questionnaires—Each participant completed the Spielberger Trait-State
Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, Gorusch, Luchene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), and the
Marlowe-Crowne Scale of Social Desirability (MC: Crowne & Marlowe, 1964).
Stimuli for cueing experiment—A pilot study presented a list of 80 words selected
from prior research to 10 people and asked them to rate each word on a 1 (low) to 7 (high)
scale for (a) threat value and (b) emotionality. The Cronbach’s alpha was .86 showing good
interrater reliability. From this pilot study, 16 neutral, 16 positive, and 16 threat words were
selected for the experimental trials. There were no differences in terms of word frequency
(Johansson & Hofland, 1989), word familiarity (Quinlan, 1992), or word length between the
three categories, F(2, 45) = 1.8, F(2, 45) = 1.9, and F(2, 45) < 1.0, respectively. The positive
and threat categories were comparable in terms of emotionality (5.8 and 5.3, respectively),
and both were higher than the neutral words (2.1). The threat words were higher in terms of
threat (6.2) than either the positive (1.3) or neutral (1.4) words (all ps < .05). The 48
stimulus words were divided into four sets of 12 words, each consisting of 4 neutral, 4
positive, and 4 threat words. A further set of 12 neutral words was selected for the practice
trials.
Procedure
Participants were brought into a testing room and told that they were to rank order 10
photographs in terms of how frightening they were and to record their ranking on a standard
response sheet. After this mood induction procedure, participants completed the STAI state-
anxiety questionnaire. This provided a measure of state-anxiety at test.
After these two tasks, participants were asked to move to a computer in the same room for
the reaction time experiment, where they were seated about 50 cm from a 35.6-cm serial
video graphics array computer monitor. All stimulus presentation and data collection was
controlled by Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL) Version 2 software (Schneider, 1988).
The participant’s task was to localize the side of the computer screen on which a target
circle appeared by pressing the Z key for left and the “/” key for right on a standard
computer keyboard. All displays were presented within three dark gray, square boxes, each
subtending a visual angle of 5°. The edge to edge separation between the boxes was 3°, and
the visual angle from the center of the middle box to the center of the peripheral boxes was
8°. The cueing display consisted of the same word printed in capital letters presented one
line above and one line below the center of either the left or the right box. The target to be
localized was a filled in white circle subtending an angle of 0.6° across the diameter. The
sequence of events within each trial was as follows (see Figure 1): A fixation point (*) was
presented at the center of the middle box and remained on the screen throughout the trial.
The word cue was presented 1,000 ms after the onset of the fixation point in either the left or
the right box for 100 ms. The cue was then blanked out, and 50 ms later the target circle was
presented in the center of either the left or the right box until the participant responded (or
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until 2,000 ms elapsed). This gave a cue-target onset asynchrony of 150 ms. There was an
intertrial interval of 1,000 ms before the next trial began.
Each participant completed a block of 48 practice trials (all neutral word cues) followed by
16 blocks of experimental trials. The 48 word stimuli (16 neutral, 16 positive, 16 threat)
were divided into four blocks, each consisting of 4 words from each category. All of the
words were presented four times each within each block (i.e., 48 trials per block). Each of
the four blocks was also presented four times each, which resulted in a total of 768
experimental trials. Each participant received a different randomized order of stimuli. For all
participants, three fourths of the trials (576) were valid (i.e., the target appeared in the same
spatial location as the cue) and one fourth (192) were invalid (i.e., the target appeared in the
opposite spatial location to the cue). Neutral, positive, and threat cues appeared equally
often on valid and invalid trials and in the left and righthand side boxes. Thus, each
individual word was presented 16 times in the experimental trials: 12 times on the valid
trials (6 on the left, 6 on the right) and 4 times on the invalid trials (2 on the left, 2 on the
right).
After the computerized task, participants moved to another table in the same room and
completed the STAI Trait-Anxiety scale, the BDI, and the MC scales. Approximately one
week later, each individual returned to the same testing room and completed the STAI state-
anxiety questionnaire again (baseline measure) and then completed the word ratings.
Design
A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue
valence: neutral, positive, threat) analysis of variance (ANOVA) factorial design was used.
Anxiety was a between-subjects factor, and cue validity and cue valence were within-
subjects factors. The prediction is that cue validity effects (i.e., faster RTs on valid relative
to invalid trials) should be larger on threat cue trials than on neutral or positive cue trials.
This larger validity effect is expected to be due to slower RTs on invalid threat cue trials
rather than to faster RTs on valid threat cue trials. This pattern is expected to be particularly
strong for high state-anxious participants.
Results
As shown in Table 1, the high state-anxious group scored significantly higher on measures
of trait-anxiety, state-anxiety at baseline and at test, and on the BDI, whereas there was no
difference between high and low state-anxious participants on the MC scale. A 2 (anxiety:
high vs. low state-anxiety) × 2 (time: at test vs. baseline) ANOVA showed only a main
effect for anxiety, F(1, 44) 51.3, MSE = 110.9, p < .001. There was no main effect for time
and no Anxiety × Time interaction, suggesting that the mood induction procedure was not
effective in increasing the level of state-anxiety above baseline.
The RT data were filtered by removing all error trials and any data points less than 100 ms
or greater than 2.5 SDs from that participant’s mean. The mean RT was then calculated for
each participant as a function of each factor in the design. This filtering procedure was used
in all subsequent experiments in this study. Errors tended to be very infrequent in this and
subsequent experiments, and therefore the analysis focused on RT data only and not on error
rates. Mean percentage error rates are presented alongside the RTs for each of the
experiments in this series. However, there was not enough variability in the error rates to
allow for parametric analysis. In the analysis of the RT data, in this and subsequent
experiments, we used the Pillais multivariate test of significance (exact F test) if there was a
violation of the sphericity assumption. Thus, if the Huynh-Feldt epsilon was less than 1.0,
the Pillais exact F is reported. We used one-tailed t tests for all planned comparisons in
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which we had a specific prediction. For comparisons in which a specific a priori prediction
was not made, the two-tailed t test was used. Finally, in this and all other experiments we
included the higher order effects of cue location in the analysis. However, the location of the
cue did not interact with any of the critical factors (or interactions) we were interested in,
and therefore the data were collapsed across cue location for all of the analyses. The mean
correct RT and error data for Experiment 1 are presented in Table 2. The RT data were
subjected to a 2 (anxiety: high and low) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue
valence: neutral, positive, negative) ANOVA. The only main effect to reach significance
was for cue validity, F(1, 48) = 317.7, MSE = 1,172.6, p < .001, with participants
responding about 70 ms faster on valid relative to invalid trials. There was also a significant
two-way interaction between cue validity and cue valence, F(2, 96) = 3.9, MSE = 84.9, p < .
024, which was not modified by anxiety, F(2, 96) < 1. Further analysis revealed that there
was no main effect for cue type on the valid trials, F(2, 98) < 1. However, on the invalid
trials there was a significant main effect for cue type, F(2, 98) 3.4, MSE = 116.1, p < .039,
such that RTs following threat word cues were slower (375 ms) than RTs following either
neutral (370 ms), t(49) = 1.6, p < .053, or positive (369 ms), t(49) = 2.6, p < .006, words.
Planned contrasts revealed that the cue validity effect (i.e., the RT difference between valid
and invalid trials) tended to be larger with threat cues (74 ms) than that observed for either
neutral (70 ms), t(49) = 1.4, p < .08, or positive (67 ms), t(49) 2.9, p < .003, cues, whereas
there was no difference between the neutral and positive cues.
Discussion
The mood induction procedure was not successful in increasing state-anxiety above a
baseline level in this experiment. Nevertheless, we did find a reliable Cue Valence × Cue
Validity interaction in the predicted direction. When the cue was a threat word, participants
took longer to localize the target on invalid trials relative to when the cue was either a
positive word or a neutral word. Against prediction, there was no difference in this pattern of
results between high and low state-anxious groups. Thus, under conditions in which a
peripheral cue was valid 75% of the time, the valence of the cue made a difference to the
speed at which people could localize a target in an uncued location. Presenting a threat word
as a cue slowed down the localization of a target in an uncued location but did not speed up
localization of the target in the cued location. These results support the notion that the
orienting mechanism of attention may be encapsulated, whereas the disengage component
may be influenced by higher level variables such as meaning or valence (see Stoltz, 1996). It
should be noted at this point, however, that the use of a target localization task allows for a
possible alternative interpretation of the cue validity effects. Rather than being due to the
allocation of attention to the cued location, as we assume, it could be that the cue validity
effects are due to the preparation of a response that was induced by the presentation of the
cue (left or right). We circumvent this alternative interpretation in Experiment 4 by using a
single response that is not associated with the location of the cue. However, we note that if
the cue validity effects are being produced by motor-preparation effects, rather than by
attentional effects, the current results are still of theoretical interest. In particular, it might be
the case that the presentation of a threatening stimulus in the visual scene can disrupt the
suppression of a prepared response to that location when the target appears in another
location. We consider this issue more directly in Experiment 4 and in the General
Discussion.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that threat words do indeed delay the response to a
target appearing in an uncued location. This suggests that the emotional valence of a cue
may influence the distribution of spatial attention or may influence response preparation
effects. Contrary to our predictions, however, there was no difference in the pattern of
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results between high and low state-anxious participants. This may have been because we
failed to induce state-anxiety above baseline levels in this experiment. An alternative
approach is to use more biologically relevant stimuli such as facial expressions. There is
evidence that facial expressions of emotion have strong attentional effects, and therefore
these stimuli may be more appropriate in order to detect a difference between people
varying in levels of naturally occurring state-anxiety (see Mogg & Bradley, 1999). We
therefore decided to conduct an additional experiment with the current paradigm, except that
schematic faces were used rather than words.
Faces were considered to be a good stimulus set to use for present purposes because there is
evidence that humans are biologically hardwired for the recognition of facial expressions of
emotion. For example, neuropsychological studies demonstrate that identity recognition and
expression recognition are independent (e.g., Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993).
Neurophysiological studies with higher primates have shown that recognition of angry facial
expressions is fast and automatic (e.g., Rolls, 1992), and similar results have been found
with humans (e.g., Esteves et al., 1994). Finally, cognitive research has demonstrated that
angry faces are especially easy to detect in visual search paradigms (e.g., Hansen & Hansen,
1988; but see Purcell, Stewart, & Skov, 1996). In the current experiment, we used simple
schematic faces with neutral, happy, and angry expressions as cues in a Posner-type cueing
paradigm (see Figure 2 for examples). In pilot work, we have found that people rate
schematic faces (similar to those used here) with angry expressions as being more
threatening than negative words. Moreover, these simple schematic faces with angry
expressions have been found to be detected more efficiently in visual search tasks than faces
with happy expressions (Fox et al., 2000).
It is reasonable to ask, of course, whether the cognitive mechanisms involved in decoding
facial expressions of emotion are also engaged in processing schematic facial expressions. A
number of studies have suggested that the use of schematic faces offers a useful
methodology to study the particular facial features that may be important in conveying facial
threat (e.g., Aronoff, Barclay, & Stevenson, 1988; Lundqvist, Esteves, & Ohman, 1999;
McKelvie, 1973; Yamada, 1993). Moreover, recent experiments using a visual search
paradigm have shown that threatening facial expressions are detected more efficiently than
positive emotional expressions (happiness) when using schematic faces (Fox et al.,
2000),which is similar to that observed with photographs of real faces (Hansen & Hansen,
1988). Thus, we argue that the use of schematic faces allows us to investigate mechanisms
of face processing that are relevant to the processing of real faces. Experiment 4 provides
more direct evidence for this assumption in showing a very similar pattern of results when
real faces are used as the stimuli.
Method
Participants—Participants were 42 undergraduate students from the University of Essex
campus community ranging in age from 17 to 31 years, with a modal age in the 20s. Those
scoring at or above a score of 40 (n = 17) on the Spielberger State-Anxiety scale
immediately prior to the experiment and those scoring at or below 35 (n = 19) were
classified as high and low state-anxious participants, respectively. These cutoffs resulted in
the loss of 6 participants who scored between 35 and 40 on the State-Anxiety scale at test.
Each person had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and participated in one
experimental session lasting about 45 min for which they received payment of £4.
Materials and Procedure—Schematic faces were created by assembling standardized
facial features in a computerized drawing package. There were three main face types:
neutral, happy, and angry, as shown in Figure 2. These simple schematic faces carrying
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emotional expressions were all reliably categorized as neutral, happy, and angry in a pilot
test in which 12 people chose one of the following labels for each of the three faces: sad,
happy, surprised, angry, disgusted, and neutral. Three jumbled faces were also constructed
from the neutral, happy, and angry faces, respectively. The internal features of the faces
were jumbled, but left-right symmetry was retained (see Figure 2). Each of the faces was 2.5
cm in height and 1.8 cm wide on the computer screen. The face stimuli were used as cues in
the experiment. The target that participants had to detect was a white circle (MEL character
#39) with a diameter of 0.3 cm. Cue and target stimuli were presented inside two dark gray
squares that were 5.3 cm high and 3.0 cm wide and were displayed 2.0 cm to the left and the
right of the central fixation point (cross shape). These squares were continuously present on
the computer screen. All of the stimuli were presented on a Pentium P5/120 PC with a 28-
cm color monitor and ATI Mach64 graphics card. All stimulus presentation and data
collection was controlled by MEL software, Version 2 (Schneider, 1988).
On arrival at the laboratory, each participant completed the STAI Trait- and State-Anxiety
scales, the BDI, and the MC Social Desirability scale. There was no mood induction
procedure in this experiment. On completion of the questionnaires, participants were asked
to move to a computer in the same room for the reaction time experiment, where they were
seated about 50 cm from the computer monitor. The participant’s task was to localize the
side of the computer screen on which the target circle appeared by pressing the Z key for left
and the “/” key for right on a standard computer keyboard. The cue display consisted of one
of the faces being presented in the upper half of either the left or the right box. The target
circle later appeared in the lower half of either the left or the right box. This was to prevent
any forward masking of the target by the face cue. The sequence of events within each trial
was as follows: A fixation point (X) was presented at the center of the screen for 1,000 ms.
A face cue was then presented in one of the peripheral boxes for either 100 ms or 250 ms,
depending on the experimental condition (see below). The cue was then blanked out, and
then either 200 ms or 50 ms later, depending on cue time, the target circle was presented in
the lower half of either the left or the right box until the participant responded (or until 2,000
ms elasped). This gave a cue-target onset asynchrony of 300 ms. There was an intertrial
interval of 1,000 ms before the next trial began.
There were two cue exposure durations (100 ms and 250 ms) used in this experiment, and
these were presented in separate blocks. Each participant completed 10 blocks of 60 trials.
These consisted of 1 practice block and 4 experimental blocks with a cue duration of 100
ms, and 1 practice and 4 experimental blocks with a cue duration of 250 ms. The order of
the sets of blocks was fully counterbalanced across participants so that one half of the
participants received the 1 practice and 4 blocks of trials with 100-ms cues first, followed by
1 practice and 4 experimental blocks of 250-ms cues. The other half of the participants
received the reverse order. The practice blocks contained jumbled face cues only while the
experimental blocks contained normal and jumbled faces randomly intermixed (neutral,
happy, and angry). This resulted in 480 experimental trials: 240 with a cue duration of 100
ms, and 240 with a cue duration of 250 ms. Three fourths (75%) of each of these trials (180)
were valid (i.e., the target appeared in the same spatial location as the cue) and one fourth
(60) were invalid (i.e., the target appeared in the opposite spatial location to the cue).
Normal neutral, normal happy, normal angry, jumbled neutral, jumbled happy, and jumbled
angry cues appeared 30 times each on valid trials and 10 times each on invalid trials. The
probability of any particular cue appearing in the left and right-hand side boxes was equal.
Thus, each type of cue was presented 80 times in the experimental trials: 40 times on the
right (30 valid, 10 invalid), and 40 times on the left (30 valid, 10 invalid).
Design—A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (order: 100-ms cues first and 250-
ms cues first) × 2 (cue exposure: 100 ms and 250 ms) × 2 (face type: normal and jumbled) ×
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2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue valence: neutral, happy, angry) ANOVA factorial
design was used. Anxiety and order were between-subjects factors, and cue exposure, face
type, cue validity, and cue valence were within-subjects factors. The main prediction is a
Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction for the normal face cues only, which should further
interact with level of state-anxiety (i.e., an Anxiety × Face Type × Cue Validity × Cue
Valence interaction). We expect that cue validity effects (i.e., faster RTs on valid relative to
invalid trials) should be larger on angry face cue trials than on either neutral or happy face
cue trials. This larger validity effect is expected to be due to slower RTs on invalid angry
face cue trials rather than to faster RTs on valid angry face cue trials. As before, this pattern
is expected to be particularly strong for high state-anxious participants. We expected no Cue
Validity × Cue Valence interactions for the jumbled faces, which were included as a control
for possible feature level differences between the different facial expressions. We had no
specific predictions regarding the pattern of results for 100-ms and 250-ms cue exposure.
Results
A total of 42 people participated in Experiment 2, but the data of 6 participants were
removed from the data set because their state-anxiety scores at the time of testing were
between 35 and 40. The data of the remaining 36 participants were analyzed. As shown in
Table 1, the high state-anxious group scored significantly higher on measures of trait-
anxiety, state-anxiety at test, and on the BDI. In contrast to the previous experiment, there
was also a difference between high and low state-anxious participants on the MC scale.
The mean correct RT data were filtered as before, and the mean RT and error data are
presented in Table 3. The RT data were subjected to a 2 (anxiety: high and low state-
anxiety) × 2 (order: 100-ms cues first and 250-ms cues first) × 2 (cue exposure: 100 ms and
250 ms) × 2 (face type: normal and jumbled) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue
valence: neutral, happy, angry) ANOVA, with Participants as a random factor. There were
main effects for anxiety, F(1, 32) = 4.9, MSE = 40,387.9, p < .034, such that participants
with high state anxiety scores were slower (342 ms) than those with low state-anxiety scores
(314 ms); cue exposure, F(l, 32) = 32.7. MSE = 2,370.2, p < .001, such that RTs were faster
following 100-ms cue displays relative to 250-ms cue displays (319 ms and 338 ms,
respectively); cue valence, F(2, 64) = 5.4, MSE = 184.3, p < .006, such that RTs were faster
on neutral (327 ms) and happy (327 ms) than on angry (330 ms) trials; and cue validity, F(l,
32) = 172.9, MSE = 1,813.2,p < .001, such that RTs were faster following valid (308 ms)
relative to invalid (348 ms) cues.
There were several significant lower order interactions, but these were subsumed under a
significant Anxiety × Cue Exposure × Face Type × Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction,
F(2, 64) = 3.2. MSE = 232.8, p < .049, which was not qualified by order, F(2, 64) < 1. In
order to break down this complex interaction, we first collapsed the data across the two
orders and examined the data for jumbled faces, only because we expected no critical Cue
Validity × Cue Valence interactions with these control stimuli.
Jumbled Faces—A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (cue exposure: 100 ms
and 250 ms) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue valence: neutral, happy, angry)
ANOVA, with Participants as a random factor was conducted on the mean RTs for the
jumbled face cues only. This analysis revealed main effects for cue exposure, F(1, 34) =
21.4, MSE = 164.5, p < .001, and cue validity, F(1, 34) = 94.9, MSE = 1,549.7, p < .001. No
other effects were significant, although there was a trend for a Cue Exposure × Cue Valence
× Validity interaction, Pillais F(2, 33) = 3.04, p < .061. This was due to a Cue Valence ×
Cue Validity interaction occurring for the short exposure time (100 ms) only, F(2, 68) =
3.26, MSE = 330.1, p < .045. Cue validity effects for happy cues (43 ms) were reliably
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larger than validity effects for angry cues (28 ms), t(35) = 2.63, p < .013 two-tailed, but were
comparable to neutral cues (37 ms). No significant effects were found for the trials with long
exposure (250 ms).
Normal Faces—A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (cue exposure: 100 ms and
250 ms) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue valence: neutral, happy, angry)
ANOVA, with Participants as a random factor was conducted on the mean RTs for the
normal face cues. This analysis revealed main effects for cue exposure, F(1, 34) = 41.1,
MSE = 1,041.7, p < .001; cue validity, F(l, 34) = 225.0, MSE = 839.2, p < .001; and cue
valence, F(2, 68) = 9.6, MSE = 229.2, p < .001. There were a number of lower order
interactions, but these were subsumed within an Anxiety × Cue Exposure × Cue Validity ×
Cue Valence interaction, Pillais F(2, 33) = 4.2, p < .023.
In order to break down this interaction, we examined the data for short (100 ms) and long
(250 ms) cue exposures separately. For the short cue exposure, there was a Cue Validity ×
Cue Valence interaction, F(2, 68) = 5.8, MSE = 185.3, p < .005, that was not qualified by
anxiety group. Further analysis revealed that the cue validity effect for angry faces (46 ms)
was larger than the cue validity effects for both neutral (34 ms), t(35) = 2.6, p < .007, and
happy (31 ms), t(35) = 3.2, p < .001, faces.
For the long cue exposure, there was also a Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction, Pillais
F(2, 33) = 4.3, p < .025, but this was qualified by an Anxiety × Cue Validity × Cue Valence
interaction, Pillais F(2, 33) = 3.7, p < .035. For the high state-anxious group, a one-way
ANOVA on the valid trials showed no difference across cue valence, F(2, 32) < 1. In
contrast, there was a significant difference across cue valence for the invalid trials, Pillais
F(2, 15) = 5.2, p < .019. Further analysis revealed that RTs following angry cues were
slower (398 ms) than RTs following invalid happy (374 ms), t(17) = 4.2, p < 01, or neutral
(370 ms), t(17) = 5.7, p < 001, cues. Additional analysis revealed that for the high state-
anxious group, cue validity effects for angry faces (70 ms) were larger than the cue validity
effects for either neutral (44 ms), t(16) = 2.44, p < .027, or happy (49 ms), t(17) = 3.27, p < .
005, faces. Cue validity effects were comparable for neutral and happy faces (44 ms vs. 49
ms, respectively).
For the low state-anxious group, a one-way ANOVA for cue valence revealed no significant
differences among the neutral, happy, and angry face cues for either valid, F(2, 36) < 1, or
invalid, Pillais F(2, 17) < 1.07 trials. Similarly, the cue validity effects for neutral (50 ms),
happy (34 ms), and angry (36 ms) face cues did not differ from each other.
Discussion
In spite of a complex five-way interaction, the results of Experiment 2 are straightforward.
First, there was a different pattern of results in the normal and jumbled face cue conditions.
In the normal face conditions, the predictions were supported for the trials with long (250
ms) cue exposure. On these trials, high state-anxious people took longer to localize a target
on invalid trials after an angry face cue relative to either neutral or happy face cues. As
predicted, the angry cues did not induce faster localization of targets appearing in the cued
location (shift component) but rather slowed down localization of targets in the uncued
location (disengage component). This pattern did not occur for the low state-anxious
participants.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 2 were supportive of the hypothesis that high state-anxious
participants take longer to disengage from angry face cues relative to happy or neutral face
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cues. This pattern did not occur for the jumbled faces, indicating that low-level visual
features of the stimuli cannot have produced the results, and this pattern also did not occur
for low state-anxious individuals. We note once again that the results may be due to the
angry facial expression disrupting the suppression of a prepared motor response, rather than
delaying disengagement from the location of a threatening stimulus. It is interesting to note
that when the cue was presented for 100 ms, all of the participants demonstrated longer RTs
on angry face trials with no difference between the high and low state-anxious groups.
However, when the cue was presented for 250 ms, this tendency disappeared for the low
state-anxious group. If the attentional hypothesis is correct, this may suggest that there is a
general tendency for attention to dwell on threat-related material when that material is
presented for a brief period. However, with longer processing time, low-anxious people may
tend to disengage more rapidly from the threat stimuli, whereas high state-anxious people
tend to maintain their attention in the location of the threat material. This tendency may have
important clinical implications, which we will discuss in the General Discussion.
Alternatively, if the response-preparation hypothesis is correct, this may suggest that threat-
related stimuli disrupt the rapid suppression of a prepared response over a longer time scale
for high-anxious individuals.
A potential difficulty with Experiment 2 is that the predicted results emerged from a
complex five-way interaction. Although the pattern of results was exactly as we had
predicted, it is possible that at least some of the significant interactions were spurious given
the relatively large number of factors present in the analysis. Therefore, we considered it
wise to attempt to replicate the main results in an experiment with fewer factors. Experiment
3 was designed to further test the hypothesis that threat cues lead to longer RTs on invalid
trials for high state-anxious individuals. In this study, all cue stimuli were presented for 250
ms and only normal faces (i.e., no jumbled faces) were presented in the experimental trials.
Method
Participants—Participants were 56 undergraduate students from the University of Essex
campus community ranging in age from 18 to 34 years, with a modal age in the 20s. Those
scoring at or above a score of 40 (n = 23) on the Spielberger State-Anxiety scale
immediately prior to the experiment and those scoring at or below 35 (n = 23) were
classified as high and low state-anxious participants, respectively. These cutoffs resulted in
the loss of 10 participants. Each person had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and
participated in one experimental session lasting about 45 min for which they received
payment of £4.
Materials and Procedure—The materials and apparatus used were the same as in
Experiment 2. The only difference was that no jumbled faces were used in the main
experiment and all cue stimuli were presented for 250 ms.
The procedure was also identical to Experiment 2. After completion of the STAI Trait and
State-Anxiety scales, the BDI, and the MC Social Desirability scale, participants completed
the computerized experiment. As before, the task was to localize the side of the computer
screen on which the target circle appeared by pressing the Z key for left and the “/” key for
right on a standard computer keyboard. The sequence of events within each trial was as
follows: A fixation point (X) was presented at the center of the screen for 1,000 ms. A face
cue was then presented in one of the peripheral boxes for 250 ms. The cue was then blanked
out, and 50 ms later the target circle was presented in the lower half of either the left or the
right box until the participant responded (or until 2,000 ms elasped). This gave a cue-target
onset asynchrony of 300 ms. There was an intertrial interval of 1,000 ms before the next trial
began.
Fox et al. Page 15









Each participant completed five blocks of 60 trials. These consisted of one practice block
and four experimental blocks. The practice block contained jumbled face cues only while
the experimental blocks contained normal faces (neutral, happy, and angry). This resulted in
240 experimental trials: Three fourths (75%) of these trials (180) were valid (i.e., the target
appeared in the same spatial location as the cue) and one fourth (60) were invalid (i.e., the
target appeared in the opposite spatial location to the cue). Neutral, happy, and angry face
cues appeared 60 times each on valid trials and 20 times each on invalid trials. The
probability of any particular cue appearing in the left- and right-hand-side boxes was equal.
Thus, each type of cue was presented 80 times in the experimental trials: 40 times on the
right (30 valid, 10 invalid) and 40 times on the left (30 valid, 10 invalid).
Design—A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3
(cue valence: neutral, positive, negative) ANOVA factorial design was used. Anxiety was a
between-subjects factor, and cue validity and cue valence were within-subjects factors. The
main prediction is an Anxiety × Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction such that cue
validity effects (i.e., faster RTs on valid relative to invalid trials) should be larger on angry
face cue trials than on either neutral or happy face cue trials. This larger validity effect is
expected to be due to slower RTs on invalid angry face cue trials, rather than to faster RTs
on valid angry face cue trials. As before, this pattern is expected to be particularly strong for
high state-anxious participants.
Results
As shown in Table 4, the high state-anxious group scored significantly higher on measures
of trait-anxiety and state-anxiety, and on the BDI. No between group difference was found
on the MC scale.
The mean correct RT and error data are shown in Table 5. The RT data were subjected to a 2
(anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue valence:
neutral, happy, angry) ANOVA with participants as a random factor. There were main
effects for cue validity, F(l, 44) = 210.7, MSE = 1,001.9, p < .001, and for cue valence, F(2,
88) = 3.73, MSE = 170.5, p < .028. Of more theoretical importance, there was also a
significant Anxiety × Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction, Pillais F(2, 43) = 5.07, p < .
011. In order to break down this interaction, we examined the data for high- and low-
anxious groups separately.
High State-Anxiety—A 2 (cue validity) × 3 (cue valence) ANOVA revealed the predicted
interaction, Pillais F(2, 21) = 5.3, p < .013. Against expectation, further analysis revealed
that there was a significant main effect for Cue Valence, F(2, 44) = 4.6, MSE = 34.0, p < .
015, on the valid trials. This was due to faster RTs following happy valid cues (315 ms)
relative to angry valid cues (320 ms), t(22) = 3.4, p < .003, two-tailed. No other comparisons
reached significance. As expected, there was also a significant main effect for cue valence
on the invalid trials, Pillais F(2, 21) = 6.3, p < .007, such that RTs following angry faces
were slower (388 ms) than RTs following either neutral (368 ms), t(22) = 3.5 p < .001, or
happy (374 ms), t(22) = 2.2, p < .02, faces. There was no difference between the neutral and
happy trials (368 ms vs. 374 ms). Planned comparisons revealed that the cue validity effect
with angry faces (69 ms) was larger than that observed for neutral faces (50 ms), t(22) = 3.0,
p < .003, and tended to be larger than for happy faces (60 ms), t(22) = 1.3, p < .09. There
also tended to be a difference between the cue validity effect with happy faces (60 ms)
relative to neutral faces (50 ms), t(22) = 2.1, p < .051, two-tailed.
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Low State-Anxiety—A 2 (cue validity) × 3 (cue valence) ANOVA revealed a main effect
for Cue Validity, F(1, 22) = 95.1, MSE = 943.5, p < .001. There was no main effect for cue
valence and no Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 replicated the theoretically interesting results of Experiment 2
and supported our hypotheses. To illustrate, high state-anxious people took longer to
localize a target on invalid trials after an angry face cue, relative to either a neutral or a
happy face cue. This pattern was not found for low state-anxious individuals, supporting the
notion that high state-anxiety may be characterized by a delay in disengaging attention from
angry faces or a disruption of the inhibition of a prepared response after a threat cue. There
was also an unexpected difference on the valid trials for the high state-anxious individuals in
this study. These participants were somewhat faster in localizing a target following a valid
happy face cue relative to a valid angry face cue. This effect is opposite to what would be
expected if anxiety was associated with a faster shift of attentive resources toward angry
faces. As this result did not occur in Experiment 2, we are inclined to consider it spurious.
Nevertheless, this is an interesting result as it is the first indication that the capture
component of attention may be open to influence by higher level variables (cf. Stoltz, 1996).
The main result, however, is the replication of the finding that, for anxious participants, the
angry face cues slowed down localization of targets in the uncued location (disengage
component).
Experiment 4
Experiments 2 and 3 used schematic face stimuli and demonstrated that high state-anxious
participants took longer to localize a neutral target if that target followed an invalid face cue
carrying an angry emotional expression, relative to either a happy or neutral emotional
expression. These findings support our hypothesis that anxiety is associated with longer
dwell time and disengagement from angry facial expressions. However, as we noted
previously, there is one aspect of our methodology that allows a possible alternative
interpretation. In the previous experiments, an informative cue was presented on either the
left- or the right-hand side of a computer screen, followed by a target on either the left- or
right-hand side. The participant’s task was to press a left key if the target appeared on the
left and a right key if the target appeared on the right. This means that the cue validity effect
(i.e., faster RTs for targets on the cued side) may have been due to the motor preparation of
a response induced by the cue rather than by an allocation of attention to the appropriate
side, as we assume. This would mean that the pattern of observed effects might be due to an
angry facial expression disrupting a prepared motor response on invalid trials (for anxious
participants) rather than the angry face holding attentive processing. This would not
necessarily affect our hypothesis as it would still suggest that threat-related stimuli are
affecting attentional mechanisms, which in turn disrupt motor preparation on invalid trials.
Nevertheless, we would like to confirm that the same results would occur under conditions
in which we could more confidently attribute the cue validity effects to attentional factors
rather than response-preparation effects. This can be achieved by using a simple detection
task in which a single key is pressed anytime a target appears, regardless of target location.
This means that the location of the cue cannot prime the correct motor response. A primary
aim of Experiment 4 was to replicate the previous results with this new task in order to
confirm that the cue validity effects are indeed due to attentional factors.
An additional aim of this experiment was to investigate our hypothesis using photographs of
real faces rather than schematic faces. Although there is evidence that results using
schematic faces are applicable to real faces (e.g., Yamada, 1993), we wanted to confirm this
with the present paradigm. Therefore, photographs of neutral, happy, and angry expressions
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were selected from the database provided by Ekman and Freisen (1976). An additional
methodological modification was made to more directly test the shift component on valid
trials. In the previous experiments, the location of the target was slightly displaced from the
location of the face cue on valid trials in order to avoid the potential problem of masking of
the target by the cue. However, this meant that on valid trials, attention had to shift from the
cue location to the target location, albeit by a very small distance. Thus, there may also have
been a disengage component operating on valid trials (from the cue to the target) in the
previous experiments. To illustrate, it is possible that anxious people did indeed shift
attention more rapidly to the location of an angry expression, but then attention also tended
to dwell on that location so that no differences were observed between the different types of
face cue on valid trials. In other words, the RT data for valid trials may reflect the balance of
two opposing processes, which cancel each other out. We would be on stronger grounds to
argue that attention did not shift faster toward angry (relative to happy or neutral)
expressions if both the cue and the target fell within the putative attentional beam (Posner,
1980). Thus, in the present experiment the target was presented at a location that was at the
center of the previous face cue. Thus, no shift was required between the location of the face
cue and the target location on valid trials. This experiment therefore provides a stronger test
of whether differently valenced faces differ in their ability to draw visual attention to
themselves.
Method
Participants—Participants were 45 undergraduate students from the University of Essex
campus community, ranging in age from 18 to 42 years, with a modal age in the 20s. Those
scoring at or above a score of 40 (n = 18) on the Spielberger State-Anxiety scale
immediately prior to the experiment and those scoring at or below 35 (n = 26) were
classified as high and low state-anxious participants, respectively. These cutoffs resulted in
the loss of 1 participant. Each person had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and
participated in one experimental session lasting about 45min.
Materials and Procedure—The face stimuli consisted of photographs of three different
individuals selected from the set provided by Ekman and Freisen (1976). There were three
different photographs of each of the three individuals (J.B., P.E., and E.M.; Ekman &
Freisen, 1976), with one portraying a neutral expression, one portraying a happy expression,
and one portraying an angry expression. These faces were all reliably categorized as neutral,
happy, and angry according to data presented by Ekman and Freisen, and this was confirmed
by our own rating in which 15 people chose one of the following labels for each of the three
faces: sad, happy, surprised, angry, disgusted, or neutral. Each of the photographs was 5.5
cm in height and 4.0 cm wide on the computer screen. The target that participants had to
detect was a black circle with a diameter of 0.3 cm. The face stimuli were used as cues in the
experiment. The center of the cue (photograph) and target (circle) stimuli were presented 5
cm to the left or right of a central fixation point (cross shape). All of the stimuli were
presented on a Macintosh Power PC, and all stimulus presentation and data collection were
controlled by PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993).
On arrival at the laboratory, each participant completed the STAI Trait and State-Anxiety
scales. On completion of these questionnaires, participants were asked to move to a
computer in the same room for the reaction time experiment, where they were seated about
50 cm from the computer screen. The participant’s task was to press a central key on a
button box if they detected the target circle on either the right- or the left-hand side of the
computer screen. They withheld a response on catch trials in which no target appeared. The
cue display consisted of a photograph of one of the faces being presented either on the left-
or right-hand side of a central fixation point. The center of the target face was 5 cm from the
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fixation point. On target trials, the circle later appeared 5 cm to the left or the right of the
fixation point. On nontarget catch trials, only the fixation point was on the screen. The
sequence of events within each trial was as follows: A fixation point “+” was presented at
the center of the screen for 1,000 ms. A cue photograph was then presented to the left or
right of fixation for 250ms. The cue was then blanked out and, after 50 ms, on target trials
the target circle was immediately presented either on the left or right of fixation. The target
remained on the screen until the participant responded (or until 2,000 ms had elapsed). This
gave a cue-target asynchrony of 300ms. There was an intertrial ms. interval of 1,000 ms
before the next trial began.
Each participant completed a short practice block of 10 trials containing 6 valid trials, 2
invalid trials, and 2 catch trials. After the practice trials, each participant completed 450
experimental trials and they could take a short break after every 90 trials if they wished. Of
the experimental trials, 60% were valid (i.e., the target appeared in the same spatial location
as the cue), 20% (90 trials) were invalid (i.e., the target appeared in the opposite spatial
location to the cue), and 20% (90 trials) were catch trials (i.e., no target appeared after the
cue display). Taken together, 150 of the experimental trials consisted of angry face cues (90
valid, 30 invalid, and 30 catch trials), 150 consisted of happy face cues (90 valid, 30 invalid,
and 30 catch trials), and 150 consisted of neutral face cues (90 valid, 30 invalid, and 30
catch trials). The probability of any particular cue appearing in the left- and right-hand-side
boxes was equal. In total, there were nine different faces presented as cues (3 angry, 3
happy, and 3 neutral). Each of these faces was presented 50 times in the experimental trials,
and each face had an equal probability of being followed by a valid, invalid, or catch trial.
Design—A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3
(cue valence: neutral, happy, angry) ANOVA factorial design was used. Anxiety was a
between-subjects factor, and cue validity and cue valence were within-subjects factors. The
main prediction is an Anxiety × Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction, such that cue
validity effects (i.e., faster RTs on valid relative to invalid trials) should be larger on angry
face cue trials than on either neutral or happy face cue trials. This larger validity effect is
expected to be due to slower RTs on invalid angry face cue trials rather than to faster RTs on
valid angry face cue trials. As before, this pattern is expected to be particularly strong for
high state-anxious participants. In addition, if there is a difference in the shift component of
attention, we would expect faster RTs on valid trials following angry face cues relative to
either happy or neutral face cues. The present experiment provides a stronger test of this
hypothesis because the cue and target appeared in the same spatial location on valid trials.
Results
As shown in Table 4, the high state-anxious group scored significantly higher on measures
of trait-anxiety and state-anxiety.
Anticipatory responses (i.e., responding on catch trials) occurred on 2.5% of the catch trials,
indicating a relatively low error rate. The errors on target present trials (i.e., not responding)
were less than 1 %. The mean false-alarm rates (i.e., anticipatory responses on catch trials)
are presented in Table 6. A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 3 (cue valence: neutral,
happy, angry) ANOVA showed a tendency for high state-anxious participants to produce
more false alarms (M = 3%) than low state-anxious participants (M = 2%), F(l, 39) = 3.0,
MSE = 24.6, p < .09.1 However, the false-alarm rate did not differ across type of cue, and
there was no Anxiety × Cue Valence interaction. The mean correct RT data for the target
1Unfortunately, we were unable to locate the raw false-alarm data for 3 participants, and thus the analysis is reported for 41
participants (17 high state-anxious and 24 low state-anxious).
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trials are shown in Table 6. These data were subjected to a 2 (anxiety: high and low state-
anxiety) × 2 (cue validity: valid and invalid) × 3 (cue valence: neutral, happy, angry)
ANOVA, with Participants as a random factor. There were main effects for cue validity,
F(1, 42) = 157.3, MSE = 766.2 p < .001, and for cue valence, F(2, 84) = 3.5, MSE = 230.1, p
< .036. Of more theoretical importance, there was also a significant Anxiety × Cue Validity
× Cue Valence interaction, Pillais F(2, 41) = 6.5, p < .004. In order to break down this
interaction we examined the data for high- and low-anxious groups separately.
High State-Anxiety—A 2 (cue validity) × 3 (cue valence) ANOVA revealed a main effect
for cue validity, F(l, 17) = 102.6, MSE = 568.1, p < .001, and for cue valence, Pillais F(2,
16) = 3.6, p < .045. Of more importance, the predicted Cue Validity × Cue Valence
interaction was marginally significant, Pillais F(2, 16) = 3.4, p < .054. Further analysis
revealed that there was no main effect for cue valence on the valid trials, F(2, 34) < 1. As
expected, there was a significant main effect for cue valence on the invalid trials, Pillais F(2,
16) = 4.0, p < .04, such that RTs following angry faces were slower (371 ms) than RTs
following either neutral (350 ms), t(17) = 2.7, p < .007, or happy (343 ms), t(17) = 2.7, p < .
007, faces. There was no difference between the neutral and happy trials (350 ms vs. 343
ms). Planned comparisons revealed that the cue validity effect with angry faces (63 ms) was
larger than that observed for neutral faces (42 ms), t(l7) = 2.5, p < .011, or for happy faces
(34 ms), t(17) = 2.6, p < .01. There was no difference between the cue validity effect with
happy faces (34 ms) relative to neutral (42 ms) faces.
Low State-Anxiety—A 2 (cue validity) × 3 (cue valence) ANOVA revealed a main effect
for cue validity, F(1, 25) = 70.8, MSE = 900.9, p < .001. There was no main effect for cue
valence and no Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction.
Discussion
Experiment 4 successfully replicated the theoretically interesting results of the previous
experiments. Once again, there was a reliable Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction for
high state-anxious participants, such that time to detect a target on invalid trials took longer
after an angry face cue, relative to either a happy or a neutral face cue. There are a number
of points to make about these results. First, the results demonstrate that the cue validity
effect was due to attentional factors and not to response preparation that might have
occurred in Experiments 1-3. It is important to note that the overall difference between valid
and invalid trials did not vary too much between the three experiments using face cues:
Experiment 2, + 40 ms; Experiment 3, + 55 ms; and Experiment 4, + 43 ms. This suggests
that the cue validity effects in all experiments are probably driven by attentional rather than
by response-preparation factors. We can be certain of this in Experiment 4 because a single
response was required regardless of whether the target appeared on the left- or right-hand
side of the computer screen.
The current results are also important in demonstrating our predicted pattern of results when
using photographs of real faces as cues, in contrast to the schematic faces used in the
previous experiments. This result confirms previous findings that the use of schematic faces
can be used as an analogue for real faces (Yamada, 1993). A final important aspect of the
present study is that the absence of any valence effects on valid trials has been confirmed.
As we pointed out in the introduction to Experiment 4, it was possible that the previous
studies may have involved a disengage component on the valid trials as the location of the
cue face and the target was slightly different. In Experiment 4, however, the target appeared
in the middle of where the cue face had appeared in valid trials (i.e., within the “attentional
beam”), and therefore no disengage or further shifting of attention would be required to
detect the target. Under these conditions there was still no evidence of any variation of RTs
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on valid trials for either high or low state-anxious participants. Thus, the current results
provide more convincing evidence that the presentation of an angry face does not induce a
faster shift of attention to itself relative to happy or neutral faces (at least under the
parameters tested in this experiment).
To summarize, Experiment 1 used word stimuli and found a Cue Validity × Cue Valence
interaction such that people took longer to respond to targets on invalid trials after threat-
related, relative to neutral or positive, word cues. However, this pattern of results did not
interact with state-anxiety group. One possibility is that there is a general tendency for
everyone to process threatening stimuli more deeply (cf. Pratto & John, 1991), leading to a
slowness of disengagement. lt may also be the case that our failure to increase state-anxiety
above baseline levels may have masked any effects that might have emerged in Experiment
1.
Experiments 2 and 3 used schematic faces representing neutral, happy, and angry
expressions, rather than words as in Experiment 1. Using these schematic face stimuli, the
predicted State Anxiety × Cue Validity × Cue Valence interaction was found. High state-
anxious people took longer to localize a neutral target (circle) in an uncued location after an
angry face cue relative to either a neutral or happy face cue. This pattern was not observed
when the features of the neutral, happy, and angry faces were jumbled (Experiment 2), or for
low state-anxious people (Experiments 2 and 3). It is worth noting, however, that an anxiety-
related difference was not found when the cue face was presented for just 100 ms
(Experiment 2), but did emerge when the cue was presented for 250 ms. This suggests that
the failure to find a difference between state-anxiety groups in Experiment 1 may have been
due to a short presentation time (100 ms). Alternatively, it may simply be a difference
between the type of stimuli (words vs. faces) used in Experiment 1 and Experiments 2-4. It
is also important to note that localization of a target in a cued location was never speeded by
either threat-related words (Experiment 1) or faces (Experiments 2 and 3) in our
experiments. Thus, it seems that threatening stimuli do not influence the response to targets
occurring in the same location, whereas they do slow down responses to targets appearing in
another location. As we noted previously, however, it is probably unrealistic to expect threat
stimuli to further speed up detection of targets on valid trials, as RTs are already very rapid.
Thus, we do not wish to draw any strong conclusions regarding the shift component of
attention from these results. However, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that
there is a delay in disengaging attention from threat stimuli in anxious participants. Again
we note that the results of Experiments 1-3 may be attributed to response preparation rather
than attentional effects, as the task was to localize the target so that the cue was predictive of
the correct response. Even if this was the case, however, we argue that the demonstration
that the valence of the cueing stimulus can disrupt performance on invalid trials is still of
interest.
Experiment 4 presented a similar task using photographs of real (neutral, happy, and angry)
faces with the important modification that participants pressed a single central button when a
target was detected. This change circumvented any possibility that the cue validity effects
may have been due to response preparation processes rather than to attentional cueing
processes. Under these conditions, a strong cue validity effect (faster RTs on valid trials)
was once again observed and this interacted with the type of face cue presented for those
with high levels of state-anxiety. As in the previous experiments. RTs for this group were
slowed on invalid trials after an angry facial expression. Furthermore, the presence of an
angry facial expression did not lead to faster detection of targets appearing in exactly the
same spatial location on valid trials.
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This pattern of results supports the hypothesis that threat-related stimuli affect the disengage
component of visual attention. Once again, these results are in line with evidence indicating
that the shift component of visual spatial attention may be immune to higher level
influences, whereas the disengage component interacts with higher cognitive variables (cf.
Stoltz, 1996). An important function of anxiety is undoubtedly to facilitate the identification
of danger in the environment. Much previous research has assumed that attentional biases in
anxiety are characterized by an increased detection of threat or orienting of attention toward
a threat location (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Fox, 1993; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg et al,
1994). However, we suggest that attentional orienting may be immune to the meaning or
valence of stimuli appearing in the visual environment. The results of our first four
experiments suggest that processes involved in the disengagement from threat distinguish
high and low state-anxious people. Threatening stimuli that appear in unattended locations
do not attract visual attention any more than neutral stimuli (Fox, 1994; White, 1996), but
once detected, they are processed more deeply and take longer to disengage from than
neutral stimuli.
The final experiment of this article was designed to confirm that mechanisms of
disengagement (rather than shifting toward threat) are what underlie attentional biases in
anxiety. Experiment 5 investigated disengagement more directly by presenting neutral,
positive, and threat-related words at fixation and requiring participants to name a target that
appeared randomly in one of four peripheral locations. The prediction was that response to
targets would be slower when threat words were presented at fixation, especially for high
state-anxious individuals.
Experiment 5
The aim of Experiment 5 was to investigate more directly the disengagement of visual
attention from threat-related, positive, and neutral words. We returned to the use of word
stimuli for this experiment so that we could use a wider range of different exemplars from
each category. This was considered necessary to establish the generality of the effect.
Moreover, much of the literature that led us to the disengage hypothesis in the first place
(e.g., Stroop and dot-probe effects) used word stimuli. Thus, we wanted to demonstrate a
clear difference in disengaging from threat between high- and low-anxious individuals using
word stimuli. Recall that in our first experiment we used word stimuli in a cueing paradigm
and found no differences between high and low state-anxious groups. Experiment 5 uses a
different paradigm to more directly assess the disengagement of visual attention from word
stimuli. Words with a neutral, positive, or threat-related valence are presented singly at
fixation. The participants’ task is to fixate on a word and then name a target letter that
appears randomly either above, below, left, or right of the fixated word. The prediction was
straightforward: High state-anxious people should take longer to respond to the target when
the fixated word is threat-related than when it is neutral or positive. This paradigm should
allow us to distinguish between the two alternative processes that could produce interference
in the Stroop task. As discussed in the introduction, Stroop-like interference might be
produced by anxious people rapidly orienting to the threat content of the word and away
from the color-naming task (i.e., indicating a shift of attention to threat content).
Alternatively, Stroop-like interference might reflect the tendency of high-anxious people to
dwell on threat-related material. As should be clear by now, our interpretation of the Stroop
effect to threat-related words is that high-anxious people are slow to disengage from the
threat content of the word, and therefore Stroop interference reflects an increased dwell time
on threat-related words. In the Stroop paradigm, it is impossible to distinguish this
mechanism from the automatic drawing of attention by negative words. However, if the
disengage hypothesis is correct, then in the present experiment we should find that
disengagement from negative words will be relatively slow, so that RTs will be longer on
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negative relative to positive or neutral word trials. This pattern is not expected to occur in
the low state-anxious group.
Method
Participants—Participants were 80 students and staff from the University of Essex
campus community ranging in age from 17 to 60 years, with a modal age in the 20s. All of
the participants were native English speakers. Those scoring above 40 (n = 36) on the
Spielberger State-Anxiety scale immediately prior to the experiment and those scoring
below 35 (n = 36) were classified as high and low state-anxious participants, respectively.
The data from 8 participants were not included in the analysis because their state-anxiety
scores fell between 36 and 39. Each person had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and
participated in one experimental session of about 25 min, for which they received payment
of £2 or course credit.
Materials and Apparatus—In all, 9 neutral, 9 positive, and 9 threat words of three to
five characters in length were selected from the database of words used in Experiment 1.
The three categories of words were matched for word frequency and familiarity. On the
basis of the original ratings of these words conducted as a pilot for Experiment 1, the
emotionality scores of the neutral words (2.3) were significantly lower than the emotionality
ratings for positive (5.3) and threat-related (5.7) words, which did not differ from each other.
Also, the threat words were rated as significantly more threatening (6.4) than either the
neutral (1.3) or the positive (1.4) words (all p values were less than .05). A further 9 neutral
words were selected for use in the practice trials. All of the participants completed a battery
of questionnaires consisting of the STAI anxiety scales, the BDI, and the MC inventory.
The computer apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1-3. The computer’s 28-cm color
monitor was housed inside a light-proof purpose-built hood with the screen approximately
65 cm from the participant’s eyes. As before, the monitor was operated in the standard 640 ×
480 pixel configuration, and the standard MEL system 72-point font with characters 0.5 cm
high was used for presentation of the stimuli. The verbal response of the participant was
measured using a head-mounted microphone attached to the voice-key port of a MEL serial
response box. The participants response (S or X or invalid response) was entered into the
computer by the experimenter via the keyboard so that accuracy could later be calculated.
Procedure—On arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in a small cubicle
containing a computer and the nature of the task was explained to them. They were told that
they would see a small box on the screen, in which would be presented an asterisk. It was
explained that the asterisk would be replaced by a word, which they should try to remember
for later. They were informed that shortly after the word was presented, a letter (S or X)
would be presented briefly either above, below, to the left, or to the right of the word. They
were instructed to name the letter as accurately and as quickly as possible. Throughout the
experiment, a dark gray box of 1-mm line thickness, 1.5-cm height, and 2.0-cm length was
displayed continuously in the center of the computer screen. At the start of each trial, an
asterisk (*) was displayed in the middle of the box for 1,000 ms. One of the word stimuli
was then displayed in the box, and after 600 ms a target stimulus (either S or X) was
presented for 50 ms at one of four locations, either 3.5 cm to the right, to the left, above, or
below the centrally presented word. This word remained at fixation until the participant
responded or until 2,000 ms had elasped. The experimenter entered the participant’s
response as quickly as possible after the response was made. There was an intertrial interval
of 500 ms.
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Each participant completed a practice block of 54 trials, followed by four blocks of
experimental trials, each consisting of 54 trials. This gave a total of 216 experimental trials,
which were divided equally into trials with targets appearing above (54), below (54), to the
left (54), and to the right (54) of the central box. For each target location, the centrally
fixated word was equally often from one of the three categories: neutral (18), positive (18),
and threat-related (18). Each of the individual words was presented twice in each block and
eight times during the entire experiment.
After the computer task, participants were directed into a well-lit testing area and asked to
fill in the questionnaire booklet. When they completed the four questionnaires (STAI state-
and trait-anxiety, BDI, MC), they were asked to write down as many of the words as they
could remember from the computer experiment. These memory data are not directly relevant
to the current article and will not be mentioned further.
Design—A 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) x 3 (word valence: neutral, positive,
threat-related) ANOVA factorial design was used for the RT analysis. Anxiety was a
between-subjects factor, and word valence was a within-subjects factor. The prediction is
that target identification times should be longer on threat-word trials than on neutral- or
positive-word trials. This effect should be particularly strong for high state-anxious
participants.
Results
As shown in Table 7, high state-anxious participants scored higher levels of trait-anxiety,
state-anxiety, and BDI scores than did low state-anxious people. Scores on the MC scale
were comparable between the anxiety groups.
Response Times—The mean correct RTs and error rates for each group are shown in
Table 8. The RT data were subjected to a 2 (anxiety: high and low state-anxiety) × 3 (word
valence: neutral, positive, threat-related) ANOVA. The results showed a main effect for
word valence, F(2, 140) = 7.3, MSE = 257.8, p < .001. The Anxiety × Word Valence
interaction was also significant, F(2, 140) = 3.9, MSE = 257.8, p < .024. Further analysis
revealed that there was a main effect of word valence only for the high state-anxious group,
F(2, 70) = 8.0, MSE = 353.2, p < .001, and not for the low state-anxious group, F(2, 70) < l.
Planned comparisons for the high state-anxious participants revealed that RTs on threat
word trials (594 ms) were slower than RTs on either positive (577 ms), t(35) 3.6, p < .001,
or neutral (583 ms), t(35) 2.6, p < .013, words. There was no difference in RT between the
positive and neutral words.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 5 supported the main hypothesis. High state-anxious individuals
took longer to name a peripheral target when they were fixating on a threat-related word
relative to either a neutral or a positive word. This pattern was not found for low state-
anxious people. These results provide further support for the hypothesis that differences in
the disengage component of visual attention are what distinguish high and low state-anxious
individuals. Thus, in our first four experiments we had a measure of the shifting of attention
toward the location of threat as well as the disengaging of attention from a location
containing threat. In all cases, there was no evidence that anxious people shifted their
attentive processing toward a threat location faster than to a neutral location. However, there
was evidence that, once they had detected threat, they then took longer to disengage from
the threat stimuli, relative to either positive or neutral stimuli. In Experiment 5, we examined
the disengagement of attention from threat words more directly and found a clear difference
between high and low state-anxious participants.
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Across five experiments, consistent results were found in support of the hypothesis that the
presence of threat-related stimuli affects the disengage component of visual attention. For
word stimuli, it was found that threat-related words slowed down RTs to targets on invalid
trials relative to positively valenced or neutral words (Experiment 1). Thus, the presentation
of a threat-related word seemed to increase attentional dwell time at that location, thereby
disrupting localization of a target appearing in another location. However, this pattern was
equally apparent for both high and low state-anxious participants. In Experiment 5, however,
when participants were required to actively fixate on centrally located words and then
categorize a peripheral target, a difference between anxiety groups was found. When the
fixated word was threat-related, high state-anxious people took longer to respond to a target
relative to when the fixated word was either positive or neutral. Thus, in a direct
examination of disengagement from words with different valences, the predicted result was
found, with high anxious people showing a slower disengagement from threat-related words
relative to low state-anxious people. The words were presented for 600 ms in Experiment 5,
compared with just 100 ms in Experiment 1, which suggests that a longer presentation time
may be important for an anxiety-related effect to become apparent.
In two experiments with schematic facial expressions as cues (Experiments 2 and 3), a clear
effect of valence on the localization of targets on invalid trials was also observed that was
associated with the level of state-anxiety. In both of these experiments, high state-anxious
participants took longer to localize a target on invalid trials after an angry expression cue,
relative to either a happy or a neutral expression face cue. The results of these two
experiments support the notion that increased state-anxiety increases the attentional dwell
time on threat-related stimuli. As noted previously, the pattern of results observed in
Experiments 2-3 may have been due to the angry facial expression disrupting the
suppression of a prepared motor response to the cue display. The attentional hypothesis was
supported directly, however, by the results of Experiment 4, in which photographs of real
faces were presented as cues and participants pressed a single central button whenever they
detected a neutral target. Once again, a clear effect of valence was found on the invalid trials
such that high state-anxious participants took longer to detect a target on invalid trials after
an angry cue. This result can be more confidently attributed to a delayed disengagement
from the location of threat stimuli for high state-anxious people. The results of Experiment
4, which used photographs of real faces, were very similar to the results of Experiment 3,
which used schematic faces. This adds to the growing evidence that the use of schematic
faces with different emotional expressions can be a useful analogue for real faces (e.g.,
Yamada, 1993). It seems that the same underlying cognitive processes are activated when
processing real or schematic facial expressions. An interesting research endeavor is to
determine the particular features of threatening facial expressions that might be particularly
effective in activating the fear detection system (see Fox et al., 2000; Lundqvist et al., 1999).
The present results are consistent with the notion that humans are biologically prepared to
analyze facial expressions of emotion, especially anger (Esteves et al., 1994). The presence
of even masked facial expressions of anger can activate the fear-detection system as shown
by psychophysiological measures (e.g., Esteves et al., 1994; LeDoux, 1996), and it is this
system that we assume to be particularly sensitive to increases in state-anxiety. The
interesting point about our results is that the interface between the attentional and affective
systems appears to be in the disengage component of visual attention rather than a shift
component. Once again this is consistent with recent evidence that the disengage component
of visual-spatial attention can be influenced by the semantic meaning of sudden-onset word
cues (Stoltz, 1996). The present results are also consistent with evidence that differences
between anxious and nonanxious individuals in terms of selectively attending to threat-
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related material occurs only when the threat-related material is actually attended (Fox, 1994;
Fox et al., 2000).
To conclude, the current results suggest that the presence of threat-related stimuli (words or
faces) influences the disengage component of visual attention in high state-anxious people.
In a recent study, Hermans, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (1999) used eye-movement
registration and found that spider-phobic participants initially oriented toward pictures of
spiders relative to flowers. This pattern was observed for stimulus presentation durations of
up to 500 ms. However, as exposure to the stimulus continued beyond 500 ms, there was a
strong tendency for spider phobics to shift their gaze away from the spider-related pictures.
This pattern was not observed in a control group and suggests that phobic individuals
rapidly disengage from threat-related stimuli after about 500 ms. On first inspection, these
results would seem to be in conflict with our proposal that anxious individuals are slower to
disengage from threatening stimuli. However, the stimulus durations in the present
experiments were generally less than 300 ms (exception was Experiment 5). This would
seem to indicate that the initial increased dwell time observed in high state-anxious
individuals may give way to a selective avoidance of the same stimuli at longer durations.
This hypothesis may provide the basis for future research.
The use of eye-movement indexes in assessing attentional bias in anxiety is an important
development in this area, and future research should be able to confirm whether there are
clear differences in the moving of the eyes toward or away from threat stimuli (see also
Bradley et al., 1998). In the meantime, we note that attentional shifts can be quite
independent of eye movements (e.g., Posner, 1978), and even if anxious people move their
eyes faster toward angry faces than low-anxious individuals, this does not necessarily refute
the hypothesis that the main difference between these groups occurs in attentional dwell
time and disengagement from threat. Research is needed to clarify these issues. It should
also be noted that we did not measure eye movements in our experiments. It is possible that
participants might sometimes shift their gaze toward the cue location so that the increased
RT on invalid trials after threat cues might reflect increased dwelling of the oculomotor
system rather than attentional dwell time. We consider that this is unlikely. First, eye
movements toward a cue location with a cue-target asynchrony of 300 ms generally occur
on less that 5% of trials (Mogg, personal communication, May 1999). If eye movements
were occurring on a high percentage of trials in our experiments, we would expect increased
error rates. In fact, the error rates were very low in all experiments. Second, the pattern of
results that occurred in Experiment 5 showing increased dwell time on fixated threat stimuli
was consistent with the pattern observed on the invalid trials in the other experiments.
Because no eye movement was required toward the threat (or neutral) stimulus in
Experiment 5 (because it was already fixated), the results can be attributed to attentional
factors. The similar pattern of results in both paradigms seems more parsimoniously
explained by attentional factors underlying both situations. Nevertheless, we acknowledge
the possibility that eye movements may have occurred on some of the trials in our cueing
experiments, and this is an issue we intend to examine in our future experiments.
Initially, we intended to investigate the shift component of attention on the valid trials in the
cueing paradigm. We do acknowledge, however, that this may not provide a fair test of the
shift component of attention. In our research, a sudden-onset peripheral cue appeared that
could be neutral, positive, or threat-related. It is well-known that sudden-onset stimuli tend
to rapidly attract visual attentive processing (e.g., Yantis, 1996), and it might be too much to
expect that the threat value of the cue would further speed the orienting of attention. A better
methodology would be to vary the time between the presentation of a cue and the onset of
the target stimulus (e.g., Christie & Klein, 1995; Remington & Pierce, 1984). By measuring
cue validity effects as a function of the cue-target temporal separation, the movement of
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attentional shifts across space can be measured. We are using this strategy in other
experiments currently taking place in our laboratory, and the results of these experiments
will allow us to better assess whether threat-related stimuli affect the shift component of
visual attention. However, given the growing evidence that the shift component of attention
may be encapsulated (Stolz, 1996; present Experiments 1-4), we are not convinced that
threat stimuli will have an advantage over other stimuli in attracting visual-spatial attention.
We also agree with Bradley and his colleagues (Bradley et al., 1998) that the degree of
attentional bias found may depend on the particular levels of state- (or trait-) anxiety
observed during testing. For example, a selective bias for threat may emerge only at
relatively high levels of state-anxiety. In particular, it is possible that differences in both the
shift and the disengage component of visual attention when threat stimuli are presented may
occur for clinically anxious people. We are currently conducting similar experiments to
those reported here with patients with generalized anxiety disorder to test this speculation. If
such a result were found, it would have important implications for the understanding of
exogenous orienting in that it would suggest that the capture mechanism might not be
encapsulated. More detailed research using different methodologies is needed to more
directly assess the shift component of attention in relation to anxiety. On the basis of our
analysis of the literature and the current pattern of results, we conclude that for subclinical
anxiety the main distinction between high- and low-anxious people occurs in the
disengagement of attention from threat-related stimuli.
Functional Consequence of a Failure to Disengage Attention From Threat
Our results indicate that a key feature of anxiety may be the inability to rapidly disengage
from threat-related stimuli. This attentional bias is likely to maintain cognitive resources on
the sources of stress (i.e., threat stimuli) and in turn may serve to maintain and enhance
anxiety states. In contrast, those who can rapidly disengage from threat-related stimuli may
not suffer increased anxiety states. Thus, rapid disengagement from threat may be functional
in keeping anxiety low, and an inability to do this may result in increased anxiety. We
suggest the following proposal as a tentative model of the attentional mechanisms
underlying anxiety (see also, Fox et al., 2000). The suggestion is that the appearance of a
new visual object in a scene automatically draws visual attentive processes (e.g., Yantis,
1996). Our research suggests that this initial orienting is an encapsulated process unaffected
by the meaning or valence of the new object. However, once the new object has been
localized, a second step involves the prioritization of stimuli in that location for further
processing. At this point, the attentional system selects relevant stimuli for further
processing. The increased dwell time for threat-related stimuli would facilitate the
identification and evaluation of the implied threat, and this mechanism may be what is
biased in anxious individuals. There is some neurophysiological evidence for such a view.
The visual pathway that subserves attentional shifts involves large, rapidly conducting cells
from the retina to the superior colliculus and then on to the pulvinar in the thalamus (see
Armony & LeDoux, 2000; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999). Although it has been found that
this pathway is sensitive to masked threatening faces (Morris et al., 1999), it does not code
for color and is primarily sensitive to contrasts. Thus, it may work rapidly to get attentive
processes to focus on new objects on the basis of simple physical information and then
further processing involving stimulus identification and evaluation occurs. Although the
relative delay in identification processes does not seem particularly adaptive, it should be
pointed out that anxiety itself is not functional. Indeed, it might be the very tendency to
dwell on threat-related stimuli that leads to feelings of anxiety and rumination on the
negative aspects of life. Although obviously speculative, this short-term increase in dwell
time on threat stimuli may flow through the cognitive system, escalating into constant
rumination and worry. Rumination and worry, of course, are key features of clinical anxiety
disorders (Mathews, 1990).
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An alternative and somewhat speculative interpretation of our results is that they may reflect
a subtle cognitive form of freezing. Animal research has shown that behavioral freezing is “a
fairly universal initial response to detection of danger throughout the animal kingdom”
(LeDoux, 1996, p. 176). With regard to natural fear-relevant triggers, LeDoux (1996) has
conceptualized the freezing response as an evolutionary gift: Faced by a predator, the
excessive weighing-up of options or superfluous movement may both be tantamount to
disaster. As a result, freezing is a kind of evolutionary safety catch designed to increase the
chances of survival in threatening situations. We propose that the prolonged disengagement
from threatening stimuli we have observed in anxious individuals may represent a subtle
cognitive form of the freezing response found in animals. There is some evidence for this, in
that many studies have demonstrated the important role of the amygdala as a mediator of
freezing behavior in animals (Fanselow, 1994). The amygdala has, of course, been found to
play a pivotal role in the mediation of fear reactions in humans (Armony & LeDoux, 2000;
Morris et al., 1998, 1999). Thus, we tentatively propose that the freezing response may
survive in humans at a subtle level, and this may account for delayed responses on tasks
involving fear-relevant threat-related stimuli. Further research is required to investigate this
hypothesis.
Conclusion
Our experiments have shown that, once detected, threat-related stimuli are more difficult to
disengage from for those with high levels of state-anxiety. Although we acknowledge that
we have not discounted the hypothesis that anxiety is associated with increased orienting of
attention toward threat-related objects, we have provided strong evidence that threat-related
objects do increase attentional dwell time for anxious individuals. This dwelling of attention
on threatening stimuli may be an important factor in the maintenance of anxiety states. On a
more general level, our results suggest that it is not only semantic features but also the
affective features of visual objects that can affect the disengage component of attention.
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Example of a typical valid trial used in Experiment 1.
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Example of the schematic face stimuli used in Experiments 2 and 3 (normal faces) and the
jumbled faces used in Experiment 2 (jumbled faces).
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Table 1
Mean Scores, on the STAI Trait and State Anxiety Scales, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale (MC) for Experiments 1 and 2
Group
Measure High state-anxious Low state-anxious t df
Experiment 1
    n 26 24
  Trait anxiety 47.6 (9.3) 34.9 (6.3) 5.6** 48
  BDI 11.6 (7.2) 5.1 (3.6) 4.0** 48
  State anxiety (B) 44.0 (12.0) 30.3 (10.5) 4.1** 44
  State anxiety (T) 46.8 (6.3) 29.5 (4.3) 11.2** 48
  MC 11.8 (5.5) 13.0 (5.2) <1 48
Experiment 2
    n 17 19
  Trait anxiety 48.3 (7.5) 35.6 (9.8) 4.3* 34
  BDI 10.2(4.2) 6.1 (4.7) 2.8* 34
  State anxiety (T) 46.2 (5.9) 29.4 (4.1) 10.0** 34
  MC 9.0(5.1) 14.8(6.1) 3.1* 34
Note. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; B = baseline; T = text. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
*p < .01.
**p < .001.
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Table 2
Mean Correct Response Times (in Milliseconds) for the Three Types of Cue Word for High and Low State-
Anxious Participants in Experiment 1
Cue word
Group Neutral Positive Threat
High anxious
Valid trials 297.0 (0.2) 298.9 (0.3) 297.2 (0.3)
Invalid trials 365.3 (0.5) 364.4 (0.5) 371.1 (0.4)
  Validity effect 68.3 65.5 73.9
Low anxious
Valid trials 303.8 (0.1) 305.3 (0.1) 303.2 (0.1)
Invalid trials 375.9 (0.1) 373.9 (0.3) 377.9 (0.3)
  Validity effect 72.1 68.6 74.7
Note. Percentage errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3
Mean Correct Response Times (in Milliseconds) for the Three Types of Cue Face as a Function of Whether
Faces were Normal or Jumbled and Cue Presentation Time (100 ms or 250 ms) for High and Low State-
Anxious Participants in Experiment 2
Cue face




  Valid trials 311 (0.2) 314 (0.2) 313 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 354 (0.3) 345 (0.2) 364 (0.2)
   Validity effect 43.0 31.0 51.0
 Low anxious
  Valid trials 287 (0.2) 288 (0.2) 288 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 312 (0.3) 319 (0.2) 329 (0.4)
   Validity effect 25.0 31.0 41.0
250 ms
 High anxious
  Valid trials 326 (0.2) 325 (0.2) 328 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 370 (0.3) 374 (0.2) 398 (0.2)
   Validity effect 44.0 49.0 70.0
 Low anxious
  Valid trials 301 (0.2) 305 (0.2) 304 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 351 (0.3) 339 (0.2) 340 (0.4)




  Valid trials 314 (0.2) 310 (0.2) 315 (0.4)
  Invalid trials 356 (0.4) 358 (0.3) 343 (0.2)
   Validity effect 42.0 48.0 28.0
 Low anxious
  Valid trials 288 (0.2) 287 (0.2) 289 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 320 (0.4) 326 (0.4) 317 (0.4)
   Validity effect 32.0 39.0 28.0
250 ms
 High anxious
  Valid trials 329 (0.2) 328 (0.2) 334 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 365 (0.3) 369 (0.4) 370 (0.4)
   Validity effect 36.0 41.0 36.0
 Low anxious
  Valid trials 306 (0.2) 307 (0.2) 303 (0.2)
  Invalid trials 340 (0.5) 342 (0.4) 347 (0.5)
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Cue face
Group and presentation time Neutral Happy Angry
   Validity effect 34.0 35.0 44.0
Note. Percentage errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4
Mean Scores on the STAI Trait and State Anxiety Scales, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale (MC) for Experiments 3 and 4
Group
Measure High state-anxious Low state-anxious t df
Experiment 3
    n 23 23
  Trait anxiety 46.5 (7.5) 35.1(7.2) 5.2** 44
  BDI 11.7 (6.4) 5.1(4.3) 4.0** 44
  State anxiety (T) 45.5 (4.8) 27.7 (4.7) 12.6** 44
  MC 13.9 (4.1) 16.4 (5.2) 1.8 44
Experiment 4
    n 18 26
  Trait anxiety 50.9 (7.2) 32.2 (9.9) 6.9** 42
  State anxiety (T) 46.1 (5.4) 27.4 (4.1) 13.1 ** 70
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; T = test.
**
P < .001.
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Table 5
Mean Correct Response Times (in Milliseconds) for the Three Types of Cue Face for High and Low State-
Anxious Participants in Experiment 3
Cue face
Group Neutral Happy Angry
High anxious
 Valid trials 317.9 (0.3) 314.5 (0.3) 319.6 (0.3)
 Invalid trials 368.3 (0.4) 374.2 (0.3) 388.3 (0.5)
  Validity Effect 50.4 59.7 68.7
Low anxious
 Valid trials 319.4 (0.3) 315.6 (0.3) 317.9 (0.4)
 Invalid trials 371.9 (0.4) 367.5 (0.4) 366.4 (0.6)
  Validity Effect 52.5 51.9 48.5
Note. Percentage errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6
Mean Correct Response Times (in Milliseconds) for the Three Types of Cue Face for High and Low State-
Anxious Participants in Experiment 4
Cue face
Group Neutral Happy Angry
High anxious
 Valid trials 308.1 (40.3) 308.6 (42.3) 308.2 (41.6)
 Invalid trials 350.1 (51.7) 342.7 (46.9) 371.4 (61.8)
  Validity effect 42.0 34.1 63.2
  False alarrn (%) 3.3 2.4 3.3
Low anxious
 Valid trials 301.7 (28.7) 303.4 (27.5) 303.3 (27.3)
 Invalid trials 344.4 (37.8) 345.4 (36.2) 340.1 (35.4)
  Validity effect 42.7 42.0 36.8
  False alarm (%) 2.4 1.6 1.6
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 7
Mean Scores on the STAI Trait and State Anxiety Scales, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale (MC) for Experiment 5
Group
Measure High state-anxious Low state-anxious t(70)
n 36 36
Trait anxiety 49.9 (9.1) 35.4 (7.1) 7.5**
BDI 12.7 (8.8) 4.0 (3.4) 5.5**
State anxiety (T) 48.5 (7.0) 29.8 (4.3) 13.6**
MC 11.8 (5.1) 13.8 (6.6) <1.4
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; T = test.
**p < .001.
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Table 8
Mean Correct Response Times (in Milliseconds) for the Three Types of Words Presented at Fixation for High
and Low State-Anxious Participants in Experiment 5
Word type
Group Neutral Positive Threat
High anxious 582.6 (1.4) 576.9 (0.9) 594.2 (1.1)
Low anxious 596.9 (0.7) 595.6 (1.0) 598.4 (0.7)
Note. Percentage errors are in parentheses.
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